



Unemployment after the Recession: 
A New Natural Rate?
Murat Tasci and Saeed Zaman
The past recession has hit the labor market especially hard, and economists are wondering whether some fundamentals 
of the market have changed because of that blow. Many are suggesting that the natural rate of long-term unemploy-
ment—the level of unemployment an economy can’t go below—-has shifted permanently higher. We use a new measure 
that is based on the rates at which workers are ﬁ  nding and losing jobs and which provides a more accurate assessment 
of the natural rate. We ﬁ  nd that the natural rate of unemployment has indeed shifted higher—but much less so than has 
been suggested. Surprising trends in both the job-ﬁ  nding and job-separation rates explain much about the current state 
of the unemployment rate. 
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Over the course of the last recession, the U.S. economy 
shrank by 4.15 percent. This large aggregate shock had 
equivalently large effects on the labor market. A total of 
8.3 million jobs were lost, and the unemployment rate rose 
from 4.7 percent to a peak of 10.1 percent in late 2009. 
Currently, more than 14.5 million people are ofﬁ  cially 
unemployed and many are underemployed. More striking is 
the length of time people remain unemployed. Unemployed 
workers stay out of work for 34 weeks on average now, 
about 50 percent longer than at previous cyclical peaks (see 
ﬁ  gure 1). These large effects of the aggregate shock on the 
labor market raise the question about how unemployment 
is likely to evolve during the recovery and over the longer 
run.
We examine trends in long-run unemployment to try to 
answer this question. Implicit in our approach is the idea 
of a natural rate of unemployment, that is, some level of 
unemployment that is unavoidable, even in good times or 
well-functioning markets. Economists attribute the rate to 
frictions in labor markets that prevent or slow down the 
allocation of unemployed workers to ﬁ  rms that are look-
ing for employees. These frictions might take the form of 
skill-job mismatches, geographical mismatches, or the costs 
of recruitment and job search (see for instance, Rocheteau 
2006). One critical question now emerging is whether the 
past recession has increased overall frictions—increasing the 
natural rate of unemployment. 
Our analysis provides some evidence that a large part of the 
increase in the unemployment rate is likely temporary but 
that the underlying trend has inched up modestly over the 
recent cycle. We also ﬁ  nd that the average duration of unem-
ployment has been increasing in the United States, and this 
increase has played a major role in the recent rise of both the 
actual unemployment rate and the estimated natural rate. 
While it may seem strange that the underlying trend ap-
pears to have increased only slightly even though the actual 
unemployment rate has doubled, the reason for this is that 
a decline in job-ﬁ  nding rates has been offset by a decline in 
separation rates as well. 
These results point to troubling developments for the labor 
market—especially when we factor in the large pool of un-
deremployed workers that has accumulated and the poten-
tial loss of human capital facing the long-term unemployed.
Job-Finding and Separation Rates and the 
Long-Run Trend of Unemployment
The unemployment rate is the main indicator of the health 
of the labor market, but it doesn’t tell us everything we need 
to know about what is driving any changes we see. It reports 
only the number of workers who are unemployed as a frac-
tion of the labor force. In any given month, however, some 
employed workers lose their jobs and some unemployed 
workers ﬁ  nd jobs, leading to ﬂ  ows of workers in to and out 
of the unemployment pool. It is largely these ﬂ  ows that drive 
the overall unemployment rate, yet the unemployment rate says nothing about them. To learn more about these ﬂ  ows, 
we track job-separation and job-ﬁ  nding rates, the average 
rates at which each of the ﬂ  ows occurs. 
These ﬂ  ows generally follow a pattern in a typical business 
cycle. As the economy enters a downturn, separations start 
rising and job-ﬁ  nding rates start falling. These movements 
cause the overall unemployment rate to rise. But the separa-
tion rate usually stabilizes before the unemployment rate 
peaks. After the separation rate levels off, most of the sub-
sequent rise in the unemployment rate is caused by a low 
job-ﬁ  nding rate. Note that this combination implies that the 
average period of unemployment gets longer: even though 
the ﬂ  ow of people into the pool of unemployed workers 
does not increase, the low job-ﬁ  nding rate means that the 
ﬂ  ow of workers out of the pool slows, enough to cause an 
increase in the average duration of unemployment. When 
the economy ﬁ  nally starts recovering, durations get shorter 
as ﬁ  rms create new jobs and absorb part of the unemployed. 
The unemployment rate falls.
The most recent recession started by following the typical 
pattern. Separations surged in the ﬁ  rst half of the recession 
and then fell. The separation rate is now at pre-recession 
levels. However, the overall unemployment rate continued 
to increase until it peaked in October 2009, much later 
than the typical pattern would have predicted and at least 
one quarter after the recession likely ended (assuming it 
coincided with the trough in output that occurred in June 
2009). The source of this rise in unemployment—and its 
persistence—is an exceptionally low level of job-ﬁ  nding 
rates (Tasci 2010). These unusually low rates also manifest 
themselves as exceptionally high rates of long-term unem-
ployment—45 percent of workers have been out of work for 
more than 27 weeks, a record share.
Figure 2 shows the pattern of separation and job-ﬁ  nding 
rates over the course of the business cycle since the 1950s 
(when the series start). We can see the rates moving in op-
posite directions, with the separation rate rising sharply and 
then falling quickly in recessions, while the job-ﬁ  nding rate 
falls initially and then rebounds slowly. However, not all of 
the movements in these rates appear to be temporary. Each 
series experiences its own longer-term trend as well, with a 
general decline in labor ﬂ  ows occurring since the mid-1980s. 
There might be several reasons behind the long-run chang-
es. Consider the job-ﬁ  nding rate, for instance. Finding a job 
is a costly process due to what economists call search and 
matching frictions. If the frictions diminish or increase, the 
job-ﬁ  nding rate will change. Say ﬁ  rms become more efﬁ  cient 
in managing their production processes or supply chains 
and thereby reduce the number of workers they need. 
Unemployed workers will have a harder time ﬁ  nding jobs, 
which will lower the job-ﬁ  nding rate. Conversely, if it gets 
easier to search for a job and ﬁ  nd a good match, say because 
of more centralized online job search sites, the job-ﬁ  nding 
rate might rise. These kinds of changes are potentially long 
Figure 1. Unemployment Rate and Duration
Figure 2. Job Finding and Separation Rates
Notes: The job-ﬁ  nding and separation rates are expressed as probabilities. 
Shaded bars indicate recessions.
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics; authors’ calculations.
Figure 3. Removing the Trend 
Component from the Data
Note: Shaded bars indicate recessions.




















































Trendlasting and not necessarily correlated with aggregate eco-
nomic activity. 
Economic theory shows that the long-run trend of the 
unemployment rate will be determined, in large part, by the 
long-run trends of these job-ﬁ  nding and separation rates. 
We argue that the best approach to quantifying the long-run 
trend of the unemployment rate is to identify the long-run 
trend in these underlying ﬂ  ow rates.
The Long-Run Trend of the Unemployment Rate: 
A “Natural” Rate? 
Having an estimate of the long-term trend in unemployment 
is important. The Federal Reserve, which has a mandate 
to achieve maximum employment as well as price stability, 
needs to know the long-run unemployment rate in order 
to judge how close employment is to the maximum at any 
point in time. Other policymakers also need a measure of 
labor market slack to help determine optimal policy. Several 
public services and transfer payments, like social security, 
are directly affected by the level of unemployment in the 
economy, as are the tax base and revenues, and manag-
ing these programs depends on forecasts which require an 
estimate of the long-term trend. 
In principle, the long-run unemployment rate is the rate that 
would prevail in the absence of shocks. Calling that rate 
“the natural rate” started with the economist Milton Fried-
man. He did not provide a clear and well-deﬁ  ned character-
ization of his concept, but rather described some features 
that it should have. We think that our approach of calculat-
ing the long-run trend rate based on the trend of the ﬂ  ow 
rates into and out of unemployment looks a lot like what 
Friedman had in mind. 
Friedman described the idea of the natural rate of unem-
ployment as a rate that would be calculated in an economic 
model sophisticated enough to capture “the actual structural 
characteristics of the labor and commodity markets, includ-
ing market imperfections, stochastic variability in demands 
and supplies, the cost of gathering information about job 
vacancies and labor availabilities, the cost of mobility, and 
so on.” 
Friedman also emphasized that the natural rate might 
change over time due to market forces or economic policies, 
an insight with strong intuitive appeal. For instance, labor 
market policies in Europe, such as high unemployment com-
pensation, strict ﬁ  ring rules, and severance policies, have 
been blamed for causing persistently high unemployment. 
It is conceivable to think that these policies resulted in a 
higher “natural” rate for Europe, which then kept the actual 
(measured) unemployment rate high there for the past three 
decades (Blanchard 2006). 
In our attempt to measure the long-term trend in the un-
employment rate, we are going to follow this guidance and 
look for a rate that is not affected by nominal variables, that 
is moving at a relatively low frequency, but which could po-
tentially change over time, albeit smoothly. Going forward, 
we will refer to this rate interchangeably as the long-run 
trend of the unemployment rate or the natural rate of un-
employment. The unique aspect of our approach is that we 
will estimate the natural rate by ﬁ  rst isolating the underlying 
trends in the job-ﬁ  nding and job-separation rates. We will 
then use these to estimate the long-term trend in unemploy-
ment by using the fact that the unemployment rate can be 
expressed as the ratio of the separation rate to the overall 
reallocation rate.
Where Is the Natural Rate?
From our discussion above, it is clear that the separation 
and job-ﬁ  nding rates have both a cyclical and a trend com-
ponent (see ﬁ  gure 3). We also know that cyclical movements 
in these rates are to a large extent determined by the ﬂ  uctua-
tions in real output. However, identifying the underlying 
long-term trend in the data is far from simple. The problem 
is that we observe only one rate, not the trend or the cyclical 
components that contribute to each data point.
There are a number of ways statisticians and economists 
decompose a series into its trend and cyclical components. 
Here, we use a statistical technique called the Kalman ﬁ  lter 
that allows us to identify these unobserved components of 
the data by assuming a statistical relationship between the 
rates and real output.
Essentially, this type of statistical model assumes that real 
output, the job-ﬁ  nding rate, and the job separation rate 
follow individual unknown trends and the series ﬂ  uctuate 
around these trends. The approach assumes that the cycli-
cal changes in the separation and ﬁ  nding rates are related 
directly to the movements in real output, such that deeper 
recessions are associated with larger declines in job-ﬁ  nding 
rates and larger increases in separations.
Figure 4 shows the trends in the job-ﬁ  nding rate, the job-
separation rate, and the unemployment rate using our 
approach. Both the job-ﬁ  nding and separation rates have 
trended down over time—the separation rate for almost 
three decades, the job-ﬁ  nding rate for the last decade. Over 
the last four decades, the long-run unemployment rate has 
moved between 5 percent and 7 percent, peaking in the 
early 1980s.
The current estimate of the unemployment rate’s long-
term trend given by the model is roughly 5.6 percent to 5.7 
percent. The dramatic jump in the actual unemployment 
rate we have observed since the beginning of the recession 
is being interpreted in our ﬂ  ows-based analysis as largely a 
cyclical phenomenon, with little movement in the long-term 
rate. The long-run trend does appear to have increased from 
its prerecession level, but by only a small margin. That rise 
has occurred because job-ﬁ  nding and separation rates have 
fallen.Note: The job-ﬁ  nding and separation rates are expressed as probabilities. Shaded 
bars indicate recessions.
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics; authors’ calculations.
Figure 4. Flows and the Unemployment Rate
Note: Shaded bars indicate recessions.
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics; authors’ calculations
Figure 5. Traditional versus Flow Approach
Note: Shaded bars indicate recessions.
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics; authors’ calculations


























































Looking into the different components of the unemploy-
ment rate trend, we see that most of the variation in the 
trend over the recession was due to a decline in the job-ﬁ  nd-
ing rate. For a given level of the separation rate, the long-
run unemployment trend will increase if the job-ﬁ  nding-rate 
trend falls. The separation rate also contributed somewhat 
to the increasing unemployment trend by slowing its trend 
decline, especially during the beginning of the recession.
These results provide us with considerable insight into the 
nature of the recent changes in unemployment rates. We see 
that the declining job-ﬁ  nding rate is not temporary, but part 
of a long-run trend. A low job-ﬁ  nding rate, as argued in an 
earlier Economic Commentary (Tasci 2010), implies long unem-
ployment durations. Along with the more apparent declining 
trend in separation rates, the declining trend in job-ﬁ  nding 
rates essentially implies that U.S. labor markets are exhibit-
ing increasingly less worker reallocation. Not only are work-
ers ﬁ  nding jobs on average at a slower rate, independent of 
the state of the economy, they are also losing (or leaving) 
their jobs at a slower rate on average. This means that while 
the long-term unemployment rate has held pretty ﬁ  rmly 
over the last several decades, the underlying ﬂ  ows have not. 
In fact, what we see is an economy with much lower worker 
ﬂ  ows into and out of unemployment.
The more traditional approach to estimating the long-run 
trend in unemployment ignores the worker-ﬂ  ow series and 
estimates the relationship using real output and the overall 
unemployment rate. That approach gives a considerably 
higher estimate of the long-run unemployment rate than 
our model and attributes more of the increase in the actual 
unemployment rate to the trend component (ﬁ  gure 5). This 
would imply a higher long-run unemployment rate com-
ing out of this recession. Even though both approaches are 
broadly consistent with each other, we believe that using the 
added information of the labor market ﬂ  ows gives the more 
accurate picture.
The Labor Market Going Forward
Since we have not seen a big rise in the long-term unemploy-
ment rate, we might expect to converge to this “natural” 
rate soon. Unfortunately, this is not likely to be the case, 
and there are several reasons to suspect that the adjustment 
might take a long time. The ﬁ  rst is the sheer extent of the 
gap between the current and long-term unemployment rates, 
regardless of the speciﬁ  c long-term rate one believes holds 
(ﬁ  gure 6). This gap reﬂ  ects the size of the aggregate shock 
that hit the economy. When the U.S. economy experienced 
a similar-size gap after the 1981–1982 recession, it took 
several years for the observed unemployment rate to drop 
to levels closer to the trend.
And it might be even harder for the labor market to adjust 
this time around. The rate of adjustment depends on how 
fast workers are reallocated between unemployment and 
the available jobs. The slower rates of worker reallocation 
we have found may act to slow the closing of the unemploy-
ment gap.There are other reasons to believe that unemployment rates 
may stay well above the long-term rate for an extended 
period of time. Because of the length of the recession, there 
is a considerable number of potential workers who are not 
formally in the labor force. We have seen one of the sharp-
est drops in the labor force participation rate in the postwar 
data, as many unemployed workers simply stopped looking 
for a job. If some of these discouraged workers decide to 
search for a job as aggregate economic activity picks up, 
unemployment might decline at an even slower rate because 
the pool of unemployed workers is being replenished with 
workers re-entering the labor force.
Another concern raised by our ﬁ  ndings is the negative 
impact of long-term unemployment on the human capital of 
the workforce. Longer unemployment spells are a problem 
because unemployed workers who are unemployed for too 
long can lose industry- and job-speciﬁ  c skills. Losing skills 
can reduce their odds of ﬁ  nding a job during the recovery 
as well as lower their productivity when they ﬁ  nally do ﬁ  nd 
one.
Ultimately, an increase in the demand for labor will deter-
mine how fast the unemployment stock will be depleted. 
Many signs point to a relatively slow adjustment for the 
labor market: the negative effects of the large pool of long-
term unemployed (due to skill loss), low demand for labor, 
as measured by job openings and vacancies, and a relatively 
large pool of underemployed workers in the form of part-
time workers due to economic slack. We could interpret 
our results of signiﬁ  cantly lower worker reallocation and a 
declining trend in job-ﬁ  nding rate as manifestations of these 
effects, as others have (Elsby, Hobijn, and Sahin forthcom-
ing, and Tasci 2010).
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